

# An Analysis of Heavy-Ion Single Event Effects for a Variety of Finite State-Machine Mitigation Strategies



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## Acronyms



- Device Under Test (DUT)
- Edge-triggered flip-flops (DFFs)
- Error Detection and Correction (EDAC)
- Finite state machine: (FSM)
- Field programmable gate array (FPGA)
- Input – output (I/O)
- Linear energy transfer (LET)
- Localized triple mode redundancy (LTMR)
- Low cost digital tester (LCDT)
- Probability of logic masking ( $P_{\text{logic}}$ )
- Radiation Effects and Analysis Group (REAG)
- Single event effects (SEE)
- Single event transient (SET)
- Single event upset (SEU)
- Single event upset cross-section ( $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ )
- Static random access memory (SRAM)

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## FSMs Implemented in FPGAs Targeted for Critical Applications

- FSMs are used to control operational flow in FPGA devices.
- Because of their ease of interpretation, FSMs simplify the design and verification process and consequently are significant components in a synchronous design.
- By definition, the current state of an FSM is stored in DFFs.
- **Significance: can be detrimental to system operation if an FSM were to change its state due to an SEU in one of its DFFs.**



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## Motivation: FSM Mitigation and SEU Testing

- Techniques have been applied to FSMs that either:
  - Correct the current state of an FSM,
  - Detect incorrect state transition, or
  - Auto-transition to a new state if an un-mapped state is reached (“safe state-machine” which is very UNSAFE).
- Currently, no heavy-ion or proton SEU studies have been performed that measure the efficacy of any of these mitigation approaches.

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## Overview



- Define FSMs and various mitigation strategies that can be applied to them.
- Discuss Goal of SEU testing: to investigate mitigation efficacy while varying frequency and giving attention to global route SEEs.
- Discuss a scheme that can be used to test the efficacy of SEU FSM mitigation strategies and provide corresponding SEU test data.


**We used the Microsemi ProASIC3 and the Virtex-5QV as DUTs. Data presented is from the ProASIC3 SEU testing.**

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## Synchronous FSMs and SEUs




- A synchronous FSM is designed to deterministically transition through a pattern of defined states.
- A synchronous FSM utilizes DFFs to hold its current state, transitions to a next state controlled by a clock edge and combinatorial logic, and only accepts inputs that have been synchronized to the same clock.
- **FSM SEUs can occur from:**
  - Caught data-path SETs,
  - DFF SEUs, and
  - Clock/Reset SETs.



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
## Mapping States into DFFs

- Each state of an FSM must be mapped into some type of encoding (pattern of bits) stored in DFFs.
  - Once the FSM state is mapped into a DFF state, it is considered a defined (legal) state.
  - Based on the number of DFFs used (N), the total number of available DFF state mappings is  $2^N$ .
  - Unmapped DFF states are considered illegal states.
- $2^3=8$  available DFF states
- 5 out of the 8 states are mapped
- 3 out of the 8 states are unused
- Other encoding schemes can be employed that use more than 3 DFFs.




## 5-State FSM Binary Encoding Example

5-State Finite State-Machine



Example of an FSM used to control a peripheral device

5-State Finite State-Machine Binary Encoding



5-State FSM with each state encoded as binary numbers.

**An SEU can change current state and cause a catastrophic event.**

## EDAC: Corrective FSM Mitigation



- **Corrective FSM mitigation** (as defined in this presentation) is a scheme that masks and corrects SEUs so that incorrect FSM state transitions do not occur.
- **Scope of presentation focuses on two corrective mitigation approaches:**
  - Localized triple modular redundancy (LTMR), and
  - Hamming Code-3.
- **Auto transitioning** (“safe state-machine” ) is a reaction to a small subset of incorrect transitions (unmapped states). They do not protect against incorrect transitioning and are not in the scope of this presentation.

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
## Adding Corrective Mitigation

- **LTMR: Triplicate each DFF and use a majority voter.**
  - Triplication + voter is treated as one DFF,
  - Encoding doesn't change,
  - Resultant FSM has 3 times the number of DFFs than the original encoding scheme, and
  - Combinatorial logic (not including the voters) does not change.
- **Hamming Code-3: requires a new encoding scheme.**

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## FSM Fault Tolerance: 5-State Conversion to a Hamming Code-3 FSM



## SEU Testing of FSMs: Efficacy of mitigation while investigating how frequency and global routing affect FSM $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s



**LETs lower than  $10 \text{ MeV-cm}^2/\text{mg}$  are used.  
Otherwise, global route SEUs dominate.**

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## ProASIC3 SEU Heavy-Ion Test Structures:



- No error detection and correction: 8-bit Binary Encoding:
  - 256 FSM states total
  - Binary: 1 DFF per bit requires 8 DFFs
- Local triple modular redundancy (LTMR): 8-bit Binary Encoding:
  - 256 FSM states total
  - LTMR: 3 DFFs per bit requires 24 DFFs
- Hamming Code-3: 5-bit encoding:
  - 32 FSM states total
  - Hamming Code-3 must represent all states plus their companion states and requires 9 DFFs


**For statistical analysis, a large number of each of these FSMs are implemented.**

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## ProASIC3 FSM Heavy-Ion SEU General Test Structure Diagram




REAG Counter Array concept is used. FSMs replace Counters.



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## ProASIC3 Heavy-Ion FSM SEU Testing



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## Novelty of SEU FSM Results



- The efficacy of previous EDAC+FSM studies was proven by means of theory or by fault injection in soft-configuration SRAM-based FPGAs.
- Problems:
  - Theory doesn't take into account data-path SETs and global route upsets;
  - EDAC implementations with FSMs are not worth-while schemes in soft configuration devices. This cannot be uncovered using fault injection because global route SETs and frequency response cannot be fully investigated with fault injection; and,
  - In general, previous studies have no regard to LET (size of SET), global routes, or frequency of operation.
- This is the first study to investigate FSM SEU response to heavy-ions while taking into account frequency, SETs, and global routing effects.

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## Conclusions



- Utilizing the Snap-Shot test scheme has shown to be a reliable approach for investigating FSM SEEs.
- Analysis of non-mitigated FSM data shows that it cannot be assumed that the  $\text{FSM-}\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s will increase across frequency.
  - Well-mitigated (e.g., LTMR and Hamming-3)  $\text{FSM-}\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s increase across frequency.
  - Non-mitigated  $\text{FSM-}\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s decrease across frequency.
- Well-mitigated  $\text{FSM-}\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s will be lower than non-mitigated  $\text{FSM-}\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s.
- Global routing:
  - A trade should be made prior to deciding whether to use mitigation because the global routing SEUs may be significant enough to erase the gains from additional mitigation circuitry.
  - At lower frequencies, mitigation will reduce global routing  $\sigma_{\text{SEU}}$ s.

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